The Nonprofit Commercial Enterprise: A Vehicle for Foreign Investment by Weinman, Alexander
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 62 
Issue 3 Select Legal Scholarship from the New 
York Law School Law Review 
Article 1 
January 2018 
The Nonprofit Commercial Enterprise: A Vehicle for Foreign 
Investment 
Alexander Weinman 
New York Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alexander Weinman, The Nonprofit Commercial Enterprise: A Vehicle for Foreign Investment, 62 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 281 (2017-2018). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
281
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 62 | 2017/18
VOLUME 62 | 2017/18
ALEXANDER WEINMAN
The Nonprofit Commercial Enterprise:  
A Vehicle for Foreign Investment
62 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. [•] (2017–2018)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Alexander Weinman was an Articles Editor of the 2016–2017 New York Law 
School Law Review. He received his J.D. from New York Law School in 2017. The author sent a formal 
request for an advisory opinion on the issues presented in this Note to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services EB-5 Adjudications Office on September 15, 2016. The EB-5 Adjudications Office responded the 
following day refusing to issue an opinion. Email from USCIS EB-5 Adjudications Office, to author (Sept. 
16, 2016, 9:46 AM) (on file with author).
www.nylslawreview.com
282
THE NONPROFIT COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE: A VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
To say that an agency’s knowledge cannot grow, and that an agency is 
prohibited from benefiting from its experience, is unreasonable.1
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EB-5 PROGRAM
 In 1990, Congress created the Fifth Preference, Employment-Based Immigrant 
Investor Program (“EB-5”), granting Green Cards2 to foreign investors meeting 
certain investment and employment creation requirements.3 Fearing this 
unprecedented program would be viewed as a means for foreigners to “buy” a Green 
Card,4 Congress promoted EB-5 as a plan designed to stimulate the U.S. economy 
by creating jobs and infusing new capital into the country.5 Since its enactment, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has approved over fifty thousand 
EB-5 investor petitions,6 almost thirty-seven thousand of which were approved since 
1. Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169, 196 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals July 13, 1998).
2. A Permanent Resident Card, known as a Green Card, allows immigrants to live and work permanently 
in the United States. See Green Card, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Services, https://www.uscis.gov/
greencard (last updated Feb. 22, 2018).
3. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
4. 135 Cong. Rec. 14287 (1989) (statement of Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-AR) (“[T]he rich ought not to be 
able to buy their way into this country.”); see also Alana Semuels, Should Congress Let Wealthy Foreigners 
Buy Green Cards?, Atlantic (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/
should-congress-let-wealthy-foreigners-buy-citizenship/406432/.
5. See USCIS Policy Manual, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Services, https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/
Print/PolicyManual.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2018) (“Congress created this employment-based fifth 
preference immigrant visa category (EB-5) to benefit the U.S. economy by providing an incentive for 
foreign capital investment that creates or preserves U.S. jobs.”); 135 Cong. Rec. 14289 (1989) (statement 
of Sen. Phil Gramm, R-TX) (“We need to bring people to this country who . . . can help us create jobs, 
growth, and opportunity.”).
6. See USCIS Form I-526 Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur and Form I-829 Petition by Entrepreneur 
to Remove Conditions Performance Data by Fiscal Year (FY1991–FY2013, 3rd Quarter), U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigr. Services (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-
data/data-set-form-i-526-immigrant-petition-alien-entrepreneur (follow “USCIS Form I-526 
Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur and Form I-829 Petition by Entrepreneur to Remove 
Conditions Performance Data by Fiscal Year (FY1991 - FY2013, 3rd Quarter) (PDF)”); USCIS Form 
I-526 Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur (Fiscal Year 2017, 4th Qtr), U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 
Services (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-
set-form-i-526-immigrant-petition-alien-entrepreneur (follow “USCIS Form I-526 Immigrant Petition 
by Alien Entrepreneur (Fiscal Year 2017, 4th Qtr) (PDF, 153 KB)”). Because immigrant investors’ 
families may immigrate with them, this number does not ref lect the total number of persons who have 
immigrated through the program, but merely the number of investors who have had approved petitions. 
See Audrey Singer & Camille Galdes, Improving the EB-5 Investor Visa Program: 
International Financing for U.S. Regional Economic Development 8 (2014), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/EB5_Report.pdf.
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October 2013.7 Many have denounced this program as a failure.8 There have been 
several instances of fraud; the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
indicted individuals and corporations for a range of crimes related to EB-5 schemes, 
including false statements, deceptive f inancial transactions, theft, and the 
unauthorized sale of securities.9 This Note focuses on a different aspect of the 
program, one that remains un-critiqued and rigid—that foreign applicants attempting 
to satisfy the EB-5 investment requirements may not make an investment in a 
nonprofit entity.
 Congress created EB-5, the fifth preference employment-based immigration 
program,10 under the Immigration Act of 1990.11 Both the statute and related 
7. USCIS Form I-526 Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur (Fiscal Year 2017, 4th Qtr), supra note 6. 
8. Eric A. Ruark & Aniqa Moinuddin, Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform, Selling America 
Short: The Failure of the EB-5 Visa Program 1 (2012), https://fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-
08/FAIR-EB5-2012_rev.pdf (“Analysis of available data strongly suggest[s] that the failure rate has 
been very high, and that the economic benefits provided by the EB-5 program have been negligible, at 
best.”). The program, partially designed to bring funds to struggling areas of the country, has been 
scrutinized as benefitting wealthier areas instead. Eliot Brown, Immigrant Investor Program for Poor 
Neighborhoods Benefits Rich Ones More, Study Shows, Wall Street J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/
immig rant-investor-prog ram-for-poor-neighborhoods-benef it s-r ich-ones-more-st udy-
shows-1476917304 (last updated Jan. 10, 2017, 9:39 AM). Additionally, critics have voiced concern over 
national security as international fugitives and individuals with possible ties to Chinese and Iranian 
intelligence have been linked to the program. Ron Nixon, Investor Visa Program Is Up for Renewal Amid 
Signs of Misuse, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2016, at A16; Ron Nixon, Scrutiny for Visa Program That Aids 
Foreign Investors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2016, at A13.
9. SEC Case Freezes Assets of Ski Resort Steeped in Fraudulent EB-5 Offerings, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Commission, (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-69.html; SEC Charges 
Unregistered Brokers in EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commission (June 23, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-127.html; SEC Halts EB-5 Scheme Stealing Investors 
in Cancer Center, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commission ( June 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-105.html; SEC: Lawyers Offered EB-5 Investments as Unregistered Brokers, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Commission (Dec. 7, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-274.html. If seeking 
investments for EB-5 projects, “[i]ndividuals and entities performing certain services and receiving 
commissions must be registered to legally operate as securities brokers . . . .” Id.
10. A limited number of employment-based visas are made available each fiscal year. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)
(2), (d)(1) (2018). The available visas are allocated among five preference categories. Id. §§ 1153(b)(1)–
(5). EB-1 visas are available to immigrants who have extraordinary ability, are outstanding professors or 
researchers, or are multinational executives or managers. Id. §§ 1153(b)(1)(A)–(C). EB-2 visas are 
available to immigrants who have exceptional ability or are members of a profession holding an advanced 
degre. Id. § 1153(b)(2)(A). EB-3 visas are available to immigrants who are professionals, skilled workers, 
or other kind of workers, as defined by the statute. Id. §§ 1153(b)(3)(A)(i)–(iii). EB-4 visas are available 
to immigrants who are considered special immigrants, id. § 1153(b)(4) (referencing the definition of 
“special immigrant” from § 1101(a)(27)), such as broadcasters, id. § 1101(a)(27)(M), and religious 
workers, id. § 1101(a)(27)(C). EB-5 visas are available to certain immigrant entrepreneurs. Id. § 1153(b)
(5)(A)(i). Each category receives a percentage of the overall limit on visas approved. Id. § 1153(b)(1), (b)
(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), (b)(4), (b)(5)(A). Fifth preference investors, through the EB-5 program, receive up to 
7.1% of all employment-based immigrant visas issued each year. Id. § 1153(b)(5)(A).
11. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 121, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(5) (2018)).
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regulations govern EB-5 requirements.12 To qualify for permanent residence pursuant 
to EB-5, investors must: prove the lawful source of their funds;13 invest14 the funds 
into a new commercial enterprise;15 and have managerial control over,16 or be a limited 
partner in,17 that enterprise.18 The funds must be used for job-creating purposes19 and 
placed “at risk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital placed at risk.”20 
Additionally, the new commercial enterprise must create21 ten full-time22 jobs for 
“qualifying employees.”23 The minimum capital investment required is $1 million.24 
However, this amount may be lowered to $500,00025 in the case of an investment in a 
new commercial enterprise creating jobs in a targeted employment area.26
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (2017); 8 C.F.R. § 216.6 (2017).
13. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e).
14. Id. (explaining that “invest” means “to contribute capital” and “capital” generally means “cash”).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e), (h) (defining “commercial enterprise”).
16. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(5). While beyond the scope of this Note, an ultra vires argument might be made 
that the addition of this criterion exceeds the power of USCIS, as no such requirement appears in the 
statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(1)(i), (5)(iii).
18. For an in-depth description of the EB-5 program, see EB-5 Adjudications Policy, U.S. Citizenship & 
Immgr. Services (May 30, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/f iles/USCIS/Laws/
Memoranda/2013/May/EB-5%20Adjudications%20PM%20%28Approved%20as%20final%205-30-
13%29.pdf.
19. See Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169, 189 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals July 13, 1998) (denying an EB-5 
petition, in part, because reserve funds were not available for purposes of job creation).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2).
21. In certain situations not relevant to this article, the requirement is that existing jobs be preserved rather 
than created. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(4)(ii) (“To show that a new commercial enterprise which has been 
established through a capital investment in a troubled business meets the statutory employment creation 
requirement, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the number of existing employees is 
being or will be maintained at no less than the pre-investment level for a period of at least two years.”). 
22. “Full-time” means at least thirty-five working hours per week. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(D); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.6(e). 
23. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (“Qualifying employee means a United States citizen, a lawfully admitted permanent 
resident, or other immigrant lawfully authorized to be employed in the United States . . . .”). This 
definition does not include the investor, his family members, or any persons admitted pursuant to a 
nonimmigrant visa. Id.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(i). Note that while the statute states that the amount may be increased “from 
time to time” by regulation, id., the amount has never been increased. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(f). However, 
the Department of Homeland Security proposed to update the regulation and increase the standard 
minimum investment from $1 million to $1.8 million and increase the targeted employment area 
investment from $500,000 to $1.35 million. EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Modernization, 82 
Fed. Reg. 4738, 4739 (proposed Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 204, 216).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(f)(2).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(ii). The statute states that “‘targeted employment area’ means, at the time of 
investment, a rural area or an area which has experienced high unemployment (of at least 150 percent of 
the national average rate).” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B)(ii). In practice, virtually all EB-5 investments are 
285
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 62 | 2017/18
 It is the position of USCIS—as well as some practitioners27—that a nonprofit 
entity cannot qualify as a commercial enterprise. First, USCIS stated in the preamble 
to its EB-5 regulations that because nonprofits do not “fundamentally engage in 
commerce,” they are categorically not commercial enterprises.28 Second, practitioners 
assert that the at-risk requirement cannot be satisfied if the investor has no 
expectation of monetary gain.29 This Note contends that a nonprofit commercial 
enterprise complies with the statute and regulations, and the at-risk requirement, 
when read correctly, permits an EB-5 applicant to contribute funds, in a donative 
sense, to a nonprofit commercial enterprise with no expectation of reimbursement or 
pecuniary gain.
 In addition, the managerial, investment, and job-creation requirements are each 
easily satisfied in the nonprofit context. The managerial requirement is met if the 
investor serves on the board of directors of a nonprofit entity. The investment 
requirement is met because to “invest” means “to contribute capital,”30 and “capital” 
means, among other things, “cash.”31 Accordingly, under the plain language of the 
regulations, the investment requirement is that the applicant contribute cash (or any 
other enumerated form of capital) to the commercial enterprise.32 In other words, 
while it could be argued that a donative contribution does not meet the at-risk 
in targeted employment areas and thus qualify for this reduction. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
Immigrant Investor Program: Proposed Project Investments in Targeted Employment 
Areas 4 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683231.pdf; see also Natalie Rodriguez, Projects in Big 
Cities Remain a Major Hitch in EB-5 Debate, Law360 (Nov. 13, 2015, 4:12 PM), http://www.law360.
com/articles/726128/projects-in-big-cities-remain-a-major-hitch-in-eb-5-debate. For example, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office estimates that in the final quarter of the 2015 federal fiscal year, 
ninety-nine percent of the all filed EB-5 petitions were based on projects in targeted employment areas. 
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra.
27. See, e.g., Carolyn S. Lee, The Meaning of “At Risk” in EB-5 Investment: 2014 Update, in Immigration 
Options for Investors & Entrepreneurs 329, 330 (Lincoln Stone et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014) (asserting 
that nonprofit entities cannot be commercial enterprises for purposes of EB-5, but citing no authority 
for the assertion); Leslie K. L. Thiele & Scott T. Decker, Residence in the United States Through 
Investment: Reality or Chimera?, 3 Alb. Gov ’t L. Rev. 103, 122 (2010) (“Investments in  non-
profit enterprises  .  .  . are also not considered  .  .  . qualifying investments for investment purposes.”); 
Stephanie Torkian, Comment, Where to, Mr. Warbucks?: A Comparative Analysis of the US and UK Investor 
Visa Programs, 38 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1299, 1309 (2015) (“A new commercial enterprise does not 
include noncommercial activity, such as a  nonprofit  enterprise . . . .”). Stephen Yale-Loehr, an 
immigration law expert, suggested that the issue of whether a nonprofit may qualify as a commercial 
enterprise would best be solved by a statutory amendment; however, a statutory amendment is 
unnecessary. See Email from Stephen Yale-Loehr, Professor of Immigration Law Practice, Cornell Law 
School, to author (July 20, 2015, 10:13 AM) (on file with author).
28. Employment-Based Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, 60,902 (Nov. 29, 1991).
29. See, e.g., Interview with Dillon R. Colucci, Guest EB-5 Immigration Law Lecturer, N.Y. Law Sch., in 
N.Y.C., N.Y. (Mar. 15, 2016); see also Lee, supra note 27, at 329–30.
30. EB-5 Adjudications Policy, supra note 18, at 4.
31. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (2017). Capital includes “cash, equipment, inventory, other tangible property, cash 
equivalents, and indebtedness secured by assets owned by the alien entrepreneur . . . .” Id.
32. Id.
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requirement, it nonetheless clearly meets the investment requirement. Lastly, 
nonprofits, of course, employ workers, and therefore nothing proprietary to the 
nonprofit entity prohibits it from meeting the job-creation requirement. Thus, in the 
context of a nonprofit, the only EB-5 applicant requirements subject to debate are 
(1) whether a commercial enterprise has been established, and (2) whether the funds 
are at risk.
 This Note contends that a foreign investor may obtain permanent residence 
through the EB-5 program by investing $500,000 in a nonprofit entity, as a nonprofit 
entity should be considered a commercial enterprise within the meaning of the 
statute and regulations, and that a donative investment satisfies the at-risk 
requirement. Part II discusses why a nonprofit entity should be considered a 
commercial enterprise, examining the governing statute, regulations, and other areas 
of business immigration law that allow nonprofit participation. Part III assumes the 
acceptance of a nonprofit commercial enterprise and explores why an investor should 
be able to satisfy the at-risk requirement by contributing capital to the nonprofit 
commercial enterprise in exchange for a “Social Return on Investment” instead of a 
pecuniary return. Part III discusses a recent trend in state corporate law—the 
adoption of benefit corporation statutes. Part IV concludes this Note.
II. THE NONPROFIT COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE33
 This section discusses why a nonprofit entity should qualify as a “commercial 
enterprise” within the meaning of the EB-5 statute and regulations. The statute 
requires the creation of a commercial enterprise, but does not define the term,34 and 
the regulations do not address the issue of whether a nonprofit entity so qualifies.35 
However, the preamble to the final EB-5 regulations states: “Because not-for-profit 
entities do not fundamentally ‘engage in commerce,’ the Service36 does not find the 
33. In the context of EB-5 petitions, the “nonprofit commercial enterprise” is a term coined by the author. 
For the remainder of this article, I ask that the reader assume we have a nonprofit entity into which a 
potential EB-5 applicant wishes to contribute the requisite capital for the purpose of creating ten jobs 
for qualifying U.S. workers and of ultimately obtaining permanent residence. Further assume that this 
applicant wishes to contribute the capital by donating it—in other words, he has no expectation that the 
funds will be returned, nor any expectation of pecuniary gain.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A) (2018). The statute provides that: 
Visas shall be made available, in a number not to exceed 7.1 percent of such worldwide 
level, to qualified immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of 
engaging in a new commercial enterprise . . . (i) in which such alien has invested . . . or, 
is actively in the process of investing, capital in an amount not less than the amount 
specified in subparagraph (C), and (ii) which will benefit the United States economy 
and create full-time employment for not fewer than 10 United States citizens or aliens 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence or other immigrants lawfully authorized to 
be employed in the United States . . . .
 Id.
35. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.
36. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (now, “Legacy” INS) issued the first EB-5 regulations in 
1991, before the agency was dissolved in 2003. How Does the USCIS Differ From INS?, U.S. Citizenship, 
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inclusion of such entities to be consistent with the statute.”37 This statement is untrue 
as a matter of law38 and is inconsistent with the regulations, which do not exclude 
nonprofit organizations.39 Furthermore, preambles to agency regulations are not 
binding—they do not have the force of law.40 Accordingly, the position taken by 
USCIS in the preamble is not dispositive, and the statute, the final regulations, and 
other areas of employment-based immigration law should be looked to for guidance 
on whether a nonprofit entity may constitute a commercial enterprise.
 A. The Statute
 First, as stated earlier, the statute does not define the term “commercial 
enterprise.”41 Second, the statute does not draw any distinction between for-profit 
and nonprofit entities.42 Third, the only text modifying the term “commercial 
enterprise” in the statute states that the commercial enterprise (1) must “benefit the 
United States economy and create full-time employment for not fewer than 10 
[qualifying workers,]” and (2) includes a limited partnership.43 Fourth, Congress 
entitled the EB-5 sub-section of the statute Employment Creation.44 In reading the 
plain text of the statute,45 it is clear that the statute’s drafters were concerned with job 
https://www.uscitizenship.info/articles/index.html%3Fp=3875.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). Its 
functions are now carried out by USCIS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection. Id.
37. Employment-Based Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, 60,902 (Nov. 29, 1991). Two commenters 
advocated for the regulations to include nonprofits in the definition of “commercial enterprise.” Id. The 
agency did not elaborate on the reasoning of these commenters. See id.
38. See discussion infra Section II.C.
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6.
40. Jodi M. Gross & Judi Abbott Curry, The Federal Preemption Debate in Pharmaceutical Labeling Products 
Liability Actions, 43 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 35, 37–38 (2007) (“[T]he preamble is not part of the 
promulgated rule but is instead an advisory opinion that is not definitively binding, merely expressing 
the [agency’s] interpretation of . . . its regulations.”); Leslie C. Kendrick, FDA’s Regulation of Prescription 
Drug Labeling: A Role for Implied Preemption, 62 Food & Drug L.J. 227, 235 (2007) (“[P]reambles to 
regulatory rules, like legislative preambles, are not understood to have force of law.”); Cristina 
Rodriguez, Comment, The FDA Preamble: A Backdoor to Federalization of Prescription Warning Labels?, 
41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 161, 178 (2007) (noting that the preamble to agency regulations is not, itself, a 
regulation, and hence is merely persuasive authority); Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of 
Seminole Rock, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 669, 691 (2015) (“[P]reambles are not binding.”).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2018).
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The modern method of statutory interpretation is “textually constrained purposivism.” Recent Case, 
Employment Discrimination—Disparate Impact—Second Circuit Declines to Extend Ricci v. Destefano, 125 
Harv. L. Rev. 1852, 1856 n.55 (2012) (citing John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 113 passim (2011)) (“Textually constrained purposivism has become increasingly common in 
statutory interpretation.”). When interpreting a statute, the reader starts with the text. Good Samaritan 
Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993) (“The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, 
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creation, but we cannot extrapolate from the text that the drafters intended for jobs 
to be created solely in for-profit entities.
 Nothing in the legislative history of the statute evinces an intention to exclude 
nonprofit entities; the legislative history, however, is rich with language evidencing 
an intention to create jobs.46 “Indeed, Congress specifically avoided constraining the 
business activities benefiting from EB-5 capital.”47 Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) stated 
that “[a]s long as the employment goal is met, it is unnecessary to needlessly regulate 
the type of business—manufacturing service, retail, or the like—nor the character of 
the investment, [c]orporations, partnerships, proprietors—all legal types of business 
entities—are appropriate . . . .”48 Thus, we can infer that the legislative purpose of 
the EB-5 program is to create jobs, and this purpose is not restricted by whether 
these jobs are created in nonprofit or for-profit entities. In other words, the statute’s 
for ‘if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.’”) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)); see also NLRB  v. United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) (“On a pure question of statutory construction, our 
first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’”). 
If—and only if—the text is silent or ambiguous, then legislative purpose and history may be looked at 
to interpret the text. See Manning, supra, at 163. Because the text of the EB-5 statute is silent as to 
whether the term “commercial enterprise” includes nonprofit entities, such a determination is perhaps 
appropriate for interpretation by regulation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. The judiciary must reject 
administrative constructions contrary to clear legislative intent, but if the legislative intent is unclear, 
the question for the court becomes whether the agency’s position is based on a “permissible construction 
of the statute.” Id. at 843. The foregoing notwithstanding, the USCIS interpretation is contrary to the 
legislative purpose of the statute. See id. at 843–44.
46. See, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec. 14561 (1989) (statement of Sen. Rudy Boschwitcz, R-MN) (“The amended 
investor provision could therefore be used to create at least 68,000 new jobs—many of them in rural 
America.”); Immigration Reform: Hearing on S. 358 and S. 448 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & 
Refugee Affairs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 101-607, 114 (1989) (statement of Sen. Alan 
Simpson, R-CO) (“We provide  .  .  . additional  .  .  . visas for immigrant investors to create jobs.”). The 
author also notes Senator Bumpers’ skepticism of EB-5’s job-creating abilities. Specifically, Senator 
Dale Bumpers said that no 4,800 foreign nationals would want to pursue EB-5 visas, and therefore, the 
Committee’s projection that 48,000 new jobs were to be created by the program annually was unrealistic. 
135 Cong. Rec. 14288 (1989). He stated, “I will stand on my head on the dome of the Capitol on 
December 31 every year and wiggle my ears if that happens.” Id. Fortunately for the Senator, he left 
Congress in 1999, prior to the large jump in EB-5 demand in 2010. Eugene Scott, Dale Bumpers, Former 
U.S. Senator & Arkansas Governer, Dead at 90, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/02/politics/dale-
bumpers-arkansas-governor-senator/index.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2016, 6:19 PM); Part 3: Demand 
for EB-5 Visas, Nat’l Immigr. F.: Blog (Sept. 3, 2015), http://immigrationforum.org/blog/part-3-
demand-for-eb-5-visas/.
47. Lee, supra note 27, at 331.
48. 136 Cong. Rec. 35615 (1990). The regulations explain that the term “commercial enterprise” includes 
other entities not listed in the regulation, “which may be publicly or privately owned.” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.6(e) (2017). As a matter of jurisprudential theory, a nonprofit is publicly owned. Greg McRay, 
Who Really Owns a Nonprofit?, Found. Group: CEO’s Blog (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.501c3.org/
who-really-owns-a-nonprofit/ (“The nonprofit organization is not ‘owned’ by the person or persons that 
started it. It is a public organization that belongs to the public at-large.”). The regulation does not 
except any type of entity, but only “noncommercial activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). Therefore, the phrase 
“or other entity which may be publicly or privately owned,” id., is inclusive rather than exclusive and 
should be interpreted to encompass all plausibly included entity types.
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job-creating purpose overrides any congressional desire for these jobs to be created in 
the for-profit sector.
 In the United States, the nonprofit sector employs over eleven million workers.49 
This accounts for over ten percent of all private sector employment.50 In New York, 
nonprofit employment accounts for over eighteen percent of private sector employment,51 
and in the District of Columbia, over twenty-six percent.52 A study conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics found that nonprofit employment increased in each year of 
the study, from 2007–2012—even during the economic recession.53
 B. The Regulations
 The legislative history of the regulations does not reveal that USCIS considered 
any evidence indicating that investments in nonprofit entities would not result in job 
creation.54 To the contrary, USCIS bases its position merely on the fact that nonprofits 
do not engage in commerce.55 The regulations do not exclude nonprofit entities, but 
do exclude noncommercial activity. The EB-5 regulations define “commercial 
enterprise” as:
any for-profit activity formed for the ongoing conduct of lawful business 
including, but not limited to, a sole proprietorship, partnership (whether 
limited or general), holding company, joint venture, corporation, business 
trust, or other entity which may be publicly or privately owned. .  .  . This 
definition shall not include a noncommercial activity such as owning and 
operating a personal residence.56 
 The exclusion of noncommercial activity presupposes a distinction between 
nonprofit and noncommercial. The example given of noncommercial activity is 
“owning and operating a personal residence”57—which is obviously a for-profit 
activity. Therefore, there must be a difference between nonprofit and noncommercial. 
The regulation uses the term “for-profit activity,” and not “for-profit entity.”58 In 
limiting the commercial enterprise to for-profit activities, the regulation does not 
exclude nonprofit entities, but rather only excludes noncommercial activity, and 
49. Nonprofits Account for 11.4 Million Jobs, 10.3 Percent of All Private Sector Employment, Bureau Lab. 
Stat.: Econ. Daily (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20141021.htm.
50. Id.
51. Erik Friesenhahn, Nonprofits in America: New Research Data on Employment, Wages, and Establishments, 
Monthly Lab. Rev. (Feb. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/nonprofits-in-america.htm.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Employment-Based Immigrants, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, 60,897–905 (Nov. 29, 1991). 
55. See id. at 60,902. As stated earlier, this position is not dispositive because it is merely stated in the 
preamble to the regulations. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
56. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (2017) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id.
290
THE NONPROFIT COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE: A VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
requires for-profit activity. In other words, the regulations only exclude nonprofit 
entities to the extent that they engage in noncommercial activity and do not engage 
in for-profit activity.
 The USCIS position that nonprofits do not engage in commerce is incorrect as a 
matter of law.59 Nonprofit entities can, and do, participate in both for-profit and 
commercial activity.60 The regulations do not exclude nonprofit entities that do 
engage in commerce from the definition of “commercial enterprise.”61 Just as some 
corporations do not engage in commercial activity (for example, those which merely 
own and operate a personal residence),62 this Note concedes that some nonprofits do 
not engage in commercial activity either. But some nonprofits do. There are several 
examples of nonprofit entities engaged in the same commercial activities as their for-
profit counterparts: there are nonprofit wineries,63 solar power companies,64 schools,65 
59. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 585 (1997) (“Nothing 
intrinsic to the nature of nonprofit entities prevents them from engaging in . . . commerce.”).
60. Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “non-profit 
entities may engage in commercial activity” (citing Dedication & Everlasting Love to Animals v. 
Humane Soc’y of the U.S., Inc., 50 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 1995))); see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340–49 (1987) (concurring opinions) 
(questioning the constitutionality of tax exemptions relating to for-profit activities of nonprofit religious 
organizations, thus acknowledging the existence of nonprofit organizations’ for-profit activities).
61. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e). From a tax perspective, nonprofits may engage in for-profit, commercial 
activity. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (2018); see Frances R. Hill & Douglas M. Mancino, 
Taxation of Exempt Organizations ¶ 21.02 (Thompson Reuters, 2017), Westlaw. The concern for 
nonprofits engaged in for-profit or commercial activity is that they may be taxed on the income from 
these activities (“unrelated business taxable income” or UBTI). Id. ¶ 21.03. Also, if a nonprofit engages 
in too much activity that triggers UBTI, it risks its nonprofit status. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e); 
Hill & Mancino, supra, ¶ 21.03 (“The regulation has spawned an extensive number of articles on the 
question of whether and to what extent a Section 501(c)(3) organization may engage in unrelated trade 
or business without jeopardizing its exemption.”). But nothing prevents nonprofits from engaging in 
for-profit, commercial activity. For example, in Revenue Ruling 73-104, a nonprofit museum sold 
greeting cards, and the issue was whether the income generated from the sale of those cards constituted 
unrelated business taxable income. Rev. Rul. 73-104, 1973-1 C.B. 263. The Treasury held that “[t]he 
fact that the cards are promoted and sold in a clearly commercial manner at a profit . . . does not alter 
the fact of the activity’s relatedness to the museum’s exempt purpose.” Id. A Revenue Ruling is an 
administrative ruling by the IRS that interprets the law and has the force of law. Understanding IRS 
Guidance–A Brief Primer, Internal Revenue Serv., https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-
irs-guidance-a-brief-primer (last updated July 6, 2016).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e).
63. Joe Becerra, Ehlers Estate Winery, Wine Country Getaways (Apr. 1, 2007), http://winecountry 
getaways.com/ehlers-estate-winery.
64. Who We Are, GRID Alternatives, http://www.gridalternatives.org/about (last visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
65. Patricia Cohen, Some Private Colleges Turn a Tidy Profit by Going Nonprofit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 2015, 
at A1. 
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clothing brands,66 restaurants,67 and even lenders.68 No one would doubt, if 
incorporated as for-profit corporations, that these entities would be engaged in for-
profit, commercial activity. So the question must be asked: Why arbitrarily and 
categorically exclude nonprofits?
 In short, nothing in the regulations precludes a commercial enterprise from being 
a nonprofit entity. Rather, the problem is that USCIS lacks clarity about what 
constitutes commercial activity. Because neither the statute nor the regulations 
exclude nonprofit entities from the definition of “commercial enterprise,” they should 
be—they are—included.
 C. Areas of Employment-Based Immigration Law Permitting Nonprofit Participation
 In addition to the lack of any statutory or regulatory prohibition on including 
nonprofit entities, other areas of law—including employment-based immigration 
law—fail to distinguish between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.69 To illustrate, 
neither the Department of Labor in the context of labor certifications,70 nor USCIS in 
the context of national interest waivers,71 draws any distinction for nonprofit entities.
 The Department of Labor’s labor certification regulations72 define “employer” as: 
66. Who We Are, Clothe Your Neighbor as Yourself, http://www.cyny.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 
2018).
67. Ginia Bellafante, Gentrification Isn’t on the Menu, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2017, at MB1; Talia Ralph, The 
Non-Profit Restaurant That Could, Forbes (Oct. 6, 2015, 7:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
taliaralph/2015/10/06/colors-non-profit-restaurant-that-could/#500c3d025729.
68. About Us, Grameen Am., http://www.grameenamerica.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 1, 2018); About, 
LiftFund, http://www.liftfund.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018); About, Opportunity Fund, 
http://www.opportunityfund.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018); Who We Are, VEDC, https://vedc.
org/about (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
69. See, e.g., Annie Clement, Contemporary Trademark Law and Sport, 12 J. Legal Aspects Sport 1, 5 
(2002) (“Intellectual property law treats for-profit businesses in the same manner as not-for-profit 
organizations.”); Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary 
Duties in the Nonprofit Sector, 77 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 281, 284 (2016) (“[N]onprofit corporation laws 
typically mirror for-profit counterparts with little more than an occasional word substitution.”); David 
W. Barrett, Note, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit 
Corporations, 77 Ind. L.J. 967, 968 (“[L]egislatures have passed laws that hold directors of nonprofits to 
the same standards as directors of for-profits.”); see also infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
70. Subject to limited exceptions (including the EB-5 category), all foreigners intending to immigrate 
through the employment-based immigration process are inadmissible unless and until the Department 
of Labor certifies that their intended employment will not disrupt wages for U.S. workers in like 
positions in the relevant geographical area. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2018). 
71. This exception to the labor certification requirement is specific to the second preference employment-
based immigration category, EB-2. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2) (2018). USCIS may waive the job offer 
requirement, which, in turn, waives the labor certification requirement, if USCIS deems the waiver to 
be in the national interest. Id. § 1153(b)(2)(B); see also Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A 
Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 203, 244–49 (2002).
72. The process of applying for a labor certification is called Program Electronic Review Management 
System (PERM). Benson, supra note 71, at 301–03.
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[a] person, association, firm, or a corporation that currently has a location 
within the United States to which U.S. workers may be referred for 
employment and that proposes to employ a full-time employee at a place 
within the United States, or the authorized representative of such a person, 
association, firm, or corporation.73
As interpreted by the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals, this definition 
encompasses nonprofit entities, which means, therefore, that nonprofit entities may 
petition for permanent residence for their employees.74 From this, we deduce that the 
Department of Labor considers bona fide job creation in the nonprofit sector to meet 
the requirements of the statute.
 Similarly, national interest waivers are available to persons who will be employed 
in the nonprofit sector.75 For example, in Matter of Redacted,76 the Administrative 
Appeals Unit (AAU)77 reversed the denial by the Nebraska Service Center (NSC) of 
a national interest waiver for an EB-278 applicant who was an “exceptional 
management consultant for a nonprofit management organization.”79 The AAU 
reversed the NSC’s decision because the applicant’s employment was in the national 
interest80: it was of no import that she would work in the nonprofit sector.81
73. 20 C.F.R. § 656.3 (2017).
74. See, e.g., Crossroads Safehouse, Inc., 2000 BALCA LEXIS 44 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor Mar. 6, 2000) 
(denial aff ’d on other grounds) (discussing a labor certification filed by a nonprofit organization); Dig. 
Freedom Inst., 2008 BALCA LEXIS 28 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor Mar. 25, 2008) (denial aff ’d on other 
grounds) (discussing a labor certification filed by a nonprofit organization); Horizon Sci. Acad., 2007 
BALCA LEXIS 41 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor Mar. 8, 2007) (denial aff ’d on other grounds) (discussing a 
labor certification filed by a nonprofit organization); Samaritans of N.Y., Inc., 1998 BALCA LEXIS 
390 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor June 2, 1998) (denial aff ’d on other grounds) (discussing a labor certification 
filed by a nonprofit organization).
75. 3 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure, § 39.04 n.41 (Michael A. Bruno et 
al. eds., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. rev. ed. 2017).
76. See id.
77. In 1994, Legacy INS consolidated the AAU with the Legalization Appeals Unit to establish the 
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which reviews appeals of negative immigration decisions. The 
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/
about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/administrative-appeals-office-aao/administrative-appeals-
office-aao (last updated Feb. 26, 2018). The AAO issues both nonbinding and binding precedent. Id.
78. An EB-2, or a second preference employment based immigration case, is an immigrant visa awarded to 
professionals with advanced degrees or exceptional abilities. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2) (2018). The EB-2 
visa requires that applicants go through the PERM process, unless the the applicant’s line of work is 
deemed in the national interest by the Department of Labor. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4)(i)–(ii) (2017).
79. 3 Charles Gordon et al., supra note 75; see Naomi Schorr, They Don’t Shoot Elephants, Do They?: The 
National Interest Waiver for EB-2 Immigrants, 70 Interpreter Releases (Thompson Reuters, St. Paul, 
Minn.), June 14, 1993, at 773, 776–77.
80. See 3 Charles Gordon et al., supra note 75.
81. Id.
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 For-profit and nonprofit entities are treated similarly in these areas of law, and 
nonprofits are even advantaged in one popular area of business immigration law: the 
H-1B nonimmigrant visa.82 The H-1B visa provides temporary work authorization 
for a professional.83 There are 65,000 available H-1B visas each year,84 less 6,800 
reserved for “H-1B1” applicants—1,400 for Chilean nationals85 and 5,400 for 
Singaporean nationals.86 But various types of nonprofit entities can be exempt from 
the cap on H-1B visas87: nonprofit research organizations and nonprofit entities 
related to or affiliated with higher education institutions may petition that their 
employees be unrestricted by the cap.88 This implies that jobs in nonprofit entities 
are even more valuable to the United States than jobs in for-profit entities, which are 
subject to the cap.
 With respect to nonprofit job creation in the EB-5 context, the USCIS position 
is at odds with its own position in analogous areas of business immigration law. 
Accordingly, because the statute and regulations permit the expansive view of 
including nonprofit entities in the definition of “commercial enterprise” and because 
other areas of business immigration law do not discriminate against the nonprofit 
sector, USCIS should embrace a broad definition of commercial enterprise, one that 
includes nonprofit entities in the EB-5 program.
82. See Austin T. Fragomen et al., H-1B Handbook § 1:40 (2018 ed.).
83. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) (2017); Lenni B. Benson et al., Immigration and Nationality 
Law: Problems and Strategies 261 (2013). 
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(vii) (2018). An additional 20,000 visas are allotted for applicants who attained 
a master’s degree or higher in the United States. Id. § 1184(g)(5)(C). 
85. Id. § 1184(g)(8)(B)(ii)(I).
86. Id. § 1184(g)(8)(B)(ii)(II). In the 2017 federal fiscal year, over 236,000 employees entered the lottery to 
be considered for one of the available visas. USCIS Completes the H-1B Cap Random Selection Process for 
FY 2017, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-completes-h-
1b-cap-random-selection-process-fy-2017 (last updated Apr. 12, 2016); Sara Ashley O’Brien, High-
Skilled Visa Applications Hit Record High—Again, CNN (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:29 PM), http://money.cnn.
com/2016/04/12/technology/h1b-cap-visa-fy-2017/. Notwithstanding serious pushback from various 
tech companies, the number of H-1B visas available has not increased in over a decade. See, e.g., George 
Packer, Change the World, New Yorker (May 27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/05/27/change-the-world (noting that while at a dinner with President Barack Obama in 
early 2011, Steve Jobs requested more H-1B visas); Robert Pear, High-Tech Titans Strike Out on 
Immigration Bill, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/technology/25tech.
html (“Bill Gates  and Steven A. Ballmer of Microsoft have led a parade of high-tech executives to 
Capitol Hill, urging lawmakers to provide more visas for temporary foreign workers and permanent 
immigrants who can fill critical jobs.”).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(5)(A)–(B).
88. Id.
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III.  CAPITAL PLACED AT RISK FOR THE PURPOSE OF GENERATING A RETURN ON 
THE CAPITAL PLACED AT RISK89
 The next hurdle to be cleared is the proposition that funds invested with donative 
intent into a nonprofit commercial enterprise are “at risk” for the purpose of the 
EB-5 regulations. This Note contends that these funds are indeed “at risk.”
 The statute itself does not use either the term “at risk” or “return.”90 Both terms 
were added by the regulations. The regulations use both terms in only one way—as 
an evidentiary component of the investment requirement.91 The regulations state: 
“[t]o show that the petitioner has invested  .  .  .  the required amount of capital, the 
petition must be accompanied by evidence that the petitioner has placed the required 
amount of capital at risk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital placed 
at risk.”92
 This requirement evidences the agency’s concern that the applicant engage in a 
bona fide contribution of capital to the commercial enterprise.93 What this 
requirement proscribes is a risk-free investment—for example, holding funds in a 
corporate savings account and conducting minimal business activities.94 This 
requirement also prohibits guaranteed returns and redemption agreements, whereby 
an EB-5 applicant is essentially guaranteed a return of his capital.95
89. This language is from the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2) (2017). It is unclear why the agency added 
the at-risk requirement twice—especially when the requirement is not in the statute. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1153(b)(5) (2018). While not the argument asserted by this Note, an ultra vires argument might be 
made questioning the validity of the at-risk requirement.
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5).
91. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2); see also Lee, supra note 27, at 331.
92. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2).
93. See, e.g., Ho, 22 I. & N. Dec. 206, 210 (Admin. Appeals Office 1998) (illustrating the concern of 
USCIS with the at-risk requirement by holding that an applicant’s funds were not at risk because he 
presented no evidence that he would engage in business activity). In Ho, the AAO refused to overturn 
the USCIS denial of an EB-5 petition where the funds merely sat in an account with no activity. Id. The 
AAO held that the funds were not at risk because there was no “meaningful[,] concrete action” with 
respect to their use. Id. An investment with donative intent into a nonprofit commercial enterprise is the 
quintessential example of the at-risk requirement. In Ho, the concern of USCIS is that a return of 
capital was guaranteed because the petitioner held the funds in an account. See id. By contrast, in the 
context of the nonprofit commercial enterprise, there is a guarantee that an EB-5 applicant will not be 
returned her funds. The risk—whether a social value will be generated—is absolute: the funds will not 
be returned to the investor (thus redemption agreements do not make sense in this context). This 
disincentivizes the commercial enterprise from engaging in the problematic “Ho situation.” A 1998 case 
reviewing the Texas Service Center’s denial of a preference visa, Izummi, conflated this criterion with 
the job-creation requirement. See Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169, 189 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals July 
13, 1998) (holding that “reserve funds . . . not available for the purposes of job creation . . . cannot be 
considered capital placed at risk.”).
94. Ho, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 210.
95. Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 189; Lee, supra note 27, at 332–35; see also EB-5 Adjudications Policy, supra 
note 13, at 5 (explaining that redemption agreements also violate the at-risk requirement).
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 The regulations state that the capital must be “at risk for the purpose of generating 
a return on the capital placed at risk.”96 In a direct investment,97 this simply means 
there is a legitimate business using the invested capital.98 In the regional center (and 
other pooled EB-5 investments) context, the risk is also clear: Will the investor be 
repaid?99 In other words: Will the project be successful enough to repay the investors? 
But, in the nonprofit context, the return on the investment is not monetary; the 
return is the utility—the social value of the investment. The at-risk requirement is 
met by the risk of the social value not being created. In this context, the at-risk 
requirement is: Will the venture create the desired social value?100 In essence, the 
inquiry is the same: Will the venture be successful? The difference is in the meaning 
of “return.” This Note argues for a broad interpretation of the word: In addition to 
encompassing a pecuniary return, the term must also encompass a social return.101
96. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2).
97. A “direct investment” is an EB-5 applicant’s investment of capital into his own business. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.6. By contrast, a regional center, id. § 204.6(e), is a pooled investment vehicle through which 
several EB-5 applicants invest funds into a common commercial enterprise, which is run by a third 
party. See What is an EB-5 Visa?, EB5 Inv., http://www.eb5investors.com/eb5-basics/what-is-eb5 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2018). Most EB-5 applicants invest in regional centers. Id. (“Roughly 90 percent of all 
EB-5 applicants invest through a regional center.”). This is likely because of the “hands-off ” approach it 
offers to investors. Id.; see also ILW.com, Introduction to Forming and Operating an EB-5 Regional 
Center: A Guide for Developers and Business Innovators 15–16 (Angelo A. Paparelli & L. 
Batya Schwartz Ehrens, eds., 2014–2015 ed.).
98. See Ho, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 206.
99. See Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 169.
100. The social impact of a nonprofit entity can be measured quantitatively. Sarah Ford, Measuring the Impact 
and Success of a Nonprofit-Corporate Partnership, America’s Charities (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.
charities.org/news/blog/measuring-impact-and-success-nonprof it-corporate-partnership. The 
benchmarks used to analyze the success of a particular nonprofit entity would, of course, have to be 
tailored to the goals of that project. Examples include the number of trainings held, the number of 
persons assisted, the types of model materials developed, the number of performances held, and the 
outcomes in cases. See Evaluation and Measurement of Outcomes, Nat’l Council Nonprofits, https://
www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/evaluation-and-measurement-of-outcomes (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2018). Sophisticated investors in the nonprofit sector already require reporting and project 
outcomes as conditions of grants. See id. For example, Safe Passage Project, a pro bono initiative created 
by immigration professor Lenni B. Benson at New York Law School to assist unaccompanied minors in 
deportation proceedings, see Our People, Safe Passage Project, https://www.safepassageproject.org/
who-we-are/our-people/#our-founder-LB (last visited Apr. 1, 2018), has a grant that offers partial 
support. See Safe Passage Project, 2015 Annual Report 19 (2015), https://www.safepassageproject.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Safe-Passage-Project-2015-ANNUAL-REPORT.pdf. The grant, 
from the New York City Council, requires monthly reports on case activity, assistance with school 
registration, health care enrollment, and any other relevant information, and mandates assistance to a 
minimum number children per year. See id. Grant reports and audits are a standard part of nonprofit 
management. See Scott Johnson, How to Write a Grant Report, Social Solutions, http://www.
socialsolutions.com/blog/how-to-write-a-grant-report/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018); Nonprofit Audit 
Guide, Nat’l Council Nonprofits, https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/nonprofit-audit-guide (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2018).
101. See infra Part III.
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 The preamble to the final EB-5 regulations explains that the definition of 
“investment” in the regulations is modeled after the Department of State’s E-2 treaty 
investor regulations.102 The Department of State’s treaty investor regulations define 
“investment” as the “placing of capital . . . at risk in the commercial sense with the 
objective of generating a profit.”103
 First, USCIS should not mistake the profit-generating activity of the commercial 
enterprise with that of the EB-5 applicant. The regulation requires that the 
commercial enterprise be engaged in for-profit activity; however, there is no 
requirement that the applicant be engaged in her own for-profit activity.104 There is a 
clear difference between an activity’s objective of generating a profit and an EB-5 
applicant’s objective of generating a profit. The EB-5 applicant’s objective of 
generating a profit in fact must be irrelevant because it is typically impossible for 
EB-5 applicants to actually generate a profit.105 Thus, USCIS need only concern 
itself with the for-profit qualities of the activity in which the commercial enterprise 
is engaged.
 Second, even though the definition of “investment” in the EB-5 regulations is 
modeled after the definition of “investment” in the E-2 regulations, this does not 
mean that both regulations define the terms in the same way. In fact, they do not.106 
102. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,897, 60,904 (Nov. 29, 1991).
103. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(7) (2017).
104. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (2017) (defining commercial enterprise). Much to the contrary, EB-5 investments 
are not typically profit-driven; they exist for the purpose of attaining permanent residence in the United 
States. Charles C. Foster, Immigration Options for Entrepreneurs Under U.S. Immigration Laws, Hous. 
Law., Nov.–Dec. 2016, at 20, 24–25. The vast majority of EB-5 applicants invest in a regional center; 
most regional center applicants lose money with EB-5 investments after accounting for legal fees, 
syndication fees, and the below-market returns on investment offered by substantially all regional 
centers, not to mention inf lation and the opportunity cost of using money. See Qiang Bjornbak et al., 
Immigration and Naturalization Law, 46 Int’l Law. 335, 342 (2012); Robert Rankey, Citizenship for 
Sale: An Evaluation of the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program After Twenty-Five Years of Iterations, 
Improvements, Kudos, and Consternation, 40 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 357, 387 (2017); Sepandat 
Stephanie Tajick, How Often is Principal Investment for an EB-5 Lost?, Quora: Blog, https://www.
quora.com/How-often-is-principal-investment-for-an-EB-5-lost (last updated June 23, 2017); What is 
an EB-5 Visa?, supra note 97. The assertion that EB-5 applicants must be personally engaged in profit-
generating activity with respect to their investments is inconsistent with industry practice. 
105. It is standard practice in the industry for regional centers to cap investors’ return on investment at less 
than one percent, non-compounded annually. See Echo Meisheng King, The Application of EB-5 Direct 
Investment in a Restaurant, EB5 Invs. (June 28, 2016), http://www.eb5investors.com/magazine/article/
eb5-direct-investment-restaurants. When the opportunity cost of money is accounted for, not to 
mention any inf lation, the notion that an EB-5 applicant must personally have a profit motive (as 
opposed to a mere desire to attain permanent residence) is nonsensical. See supra note 104 and 
accompanying text.
106. This should be no surprise, as the two programs are different in nature. Most E-2 investors live off of 
the businesses they start, see 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e)(2)(i) (noting that E-2 investments cannot be “in a 
marginal enterprise solely for the purpose of earning a living”), while most EB-5 applicants invest in 
regional centers (and thus have no access to their monies or profits, if any, for years), living and working 
where they choose. See ILW.com, supra note 97, at 17. Hence, the definitions of “investment” should be 
different to accommodate the differences between the two programs. 
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Because the drafters of the EB-5 regulations modeled the definition of “investment” 
after the E-2 regulations, we may infer that the drafters intended any differences 
between them, and that these differences are meaningful.107
 While the E-2 regulations use the term “profit” in defining “investment,”108 the 
EB-5 regulations do not.109 Therefore, the drafters intended a different (and arguably 
broader) use of “investment” as applied to EB-5, than as applied to E-2.110 The E-2 
regulations say that the investment must be “at risk . . . with the objective of generating 
a profit,”111 while the EB-5 regulations say that the investment must be “at risk for the 
purpose of generating a return.”112 If the drafters of the EB-5 regulations modeled 
those regulations after the E-2 regulations, they could easily have used the same 
language.113 But they did not. Instead of using the word “profit,” which connotes 
pecuniary gain, they used the word “return,” which is a broader term, encompassing 
more.114 Accordingly, the EB-5 regulations allow for an investor to disregard her own 
profit-generating motives and focus on the return-generating goals of the commercial 
enterprise, whether that enterprise is a for-profit or nonprofit entity.
 The idea of a non-monetary “return” on investment, or a “Social Return on 
Investment” (SROI) is widely accepted.115 SROI is “essentially a specialized cost-
107. In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, the Court held that because Congress heard testimony that included 
the technical term “working conditions,” and then incorporated that term into the statute, Congress 
intended to adopt the technical meaning of the term in the statute. 417 U.S. 188, 201–03 (1974). 
Applying this logic, because USCIS looked at the Department of State’s at-risk requirement in the E-2 
regulations when drafting the at-risk requirement in the EB-5 regulations, it could have simply adopted 
the same language—that is, it would have used the term “profit”—if it had wanted the EB-5 regulations 
to have the same meaning as the E-2 regulations. But by using a different term—“return”—we infer that 
USCIS intended a different at-risk requirement. 
108. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(7) (“Investment means the treaty investor’s placing of capital, including funds and 
other assets, at risk in the commercial sense with the objective of generating a profit.”) (emphasis added).
109. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2).
110. Supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(7).
112. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2).
113. Supra note 107.
114. Compare Profit, Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/profit?s=t (last visited Apr. 1, 
2018) (defining profit as a “pecuniary gain resulting from the employment of capital in any transaction”), 
and Profit, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/profit (last visited Apr. 
1, 2018) (defining profit as “money that is made in a business”), with Return, Dictionary.com, http://
www.dictionary.com/browse/return (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (defining return as “reciprocation”), and 
Return, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/return?utm_campaign= 
sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (defining return to mean 
“something given in repayment or reciprocation”).
115. See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business 
Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 623, 
647–54 (2007). SROI even has its own Wikipedia page, which defines SROI as “a principles-based 
method for measuring extra-financial value (i.e., environmental and social value not currently ref lected 
in conventional financial accounts) relative to resources invested. It can be used by any entity to evaluate 
impact on stakeholders, identify ways to improve performance, and enhance the performance of 
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benefit analysis” pioneered by the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund, a venture 
philanthropy fund, in the 1990s.116 It is a measurement of the extra-financial value, 
or the social, environmental, and economic value, created by an organization.117
Generally, if an investor gets utility out of something (e.g., environmentally 
sustainable practices of a business) other than a monetary return on his 
investment, the investor’s total return on investment includes both the 
monetary return and the value of that additional item. Thus, as the corporate 
social responsibility literature discusses,  such an investor may be willing to 
accept a lower monetary return on his investment than he would in the 
absence of the non-monetary item. The Green Bay Packers provide a stark 
example of this phenomenon in the NFL. The Packers recently completed its 
fifth public offering of stock, offering shares of Packer stock at $250 per share 
and adding more than 250,000 new shareholders. The offering documents 
stated that investors should not expect any monetary return on this 
investment; the Packers do not pay dividends, and if an owner wishes to sell 
his stock, he must offer it for sale first to the Packer organization for just 
pennies. Given these terms, each person who subscribes for Packer stock 
must believe that the non-monetary return (e.g., the pride of being a fan-
owner) is sufficiently valuable to justify investing in the team, even without 
the prospect of receiving any financial return on the investment.118
 In the above excerpt, the examples given of “utility”—the SROI—are a business 
(1) becoming environmentally sustainable, and (2) having team pride.119 Any social 
value that the investor is willing to accept in return for his contribution of capital 
should suffice.120
 A recent trend in state corporate law evidences the business world’s embrace of 
SROI.121 Several states have enacted statutes allowing for incorporation as a benefit 
investments.” Social Return on Investment, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_return_
on_investment (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
116. Alice Hohler, Measuring the Bang of Every Donated Buck, Wall Street J. (Mar. 1, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703787304575075340954767332.
117. See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a 
Legal Lens, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 831, 868 (2008).
118. Heather M. Field, Throwing the Red Flag: Challenging the NFL’s Lessons for American Business, 38 J. 
Corp. L. 381, 394 (2012).
119. Id.
120. See Kerr, supra note 115, at 652–53. Philanthropic goals are increasingly accepted as valid business 
purposes. Many states have authorized benefit corporations, which both serve their shareholders and 
promote social goals. See Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, Forbes: 
Community Voice (May 30, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-
consider-a-benefit-corporation/#5c10e0bd6ea3; infra note 124 and accompanying text.
121. See Sarah Murray, Benefit Corporations: Social Missions, Fin. Times (May 17, 2012), https://www.ft.com/
content/23328000-9b42-11e1-8b36-00144feabdc0.
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corporation122: For example, Delaware’s benefit corporation statute defines a “public 
benefit corporation” as:
a for-profit corporation  .  .  . that is intended to produce a public benefit or 
public benefits and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner. To 
that end, a public benefit corporation shall be managed in a manner that 
balances stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or 
benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.123
In other words, the return given to stockholders of benefit corporations includes 
SROI; the corporation has a legal obligation to use its resources to create social 
value.124
 Lastly, a broad definition of “return” is already embraced in the EB-5 context. 
Most EB-5 applicants invest in a pooled investment vehicle, or regional center.125 
These regional centers typically offer exceptionally low rates of return—often capped 
at less than one percent, non-compounded annually.126 These investments are also 
high-risk.127 Investors accept these high-risk, low-return investments in consideration 
of the regional center providing a mechanism through which investors will hopefully 
attain permanent residence.128 Therefore, the value of attaining permanent residence 
is already part of the investors’ return.129 Especially since a broad interpretation of 
“return” is already accepted, USCIS should embrace the concept of social return.
 With a broad definition of “return,” the at-risk requirement is easily met. Provided 
the funds are used to achieve a social value that may or may not come to fruition, the 
funds are “at risk” within the meaning of the EB-5 regulations.
122. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 14602 (West 2012), Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 362 (West 2015); N.Y. Bus. 
Corp. Law § 1701 (McKinney 2012). There are currently thirty-four states that have passed benefit 
corporation statutes. State by State Status of Legislation, Benefit Corp., http://benefitcorp.net/
policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
123. Tit. 8, § 362.
124. See, e.g., id. § 365(a); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1706; cf. id. § 1707 (explaining that directors must 
“consider” the effects of any corporate action upon, inter alia, the ability of the benefit corporation to 
accomplish its public benefit purpose(s), but is not required to give priority to that interest over the 
pecuniary interests of its shareholders). There are currently over 1,600 benefit corporations in the 
United States. Ben Schiller, Should Your Company Be A Benefit Corporation, A B Corp, or What?, Fast 
Company (Mar. 27, 2017) https://www.fastcompany.com/3069192/should-my-company-be-a-benefit-
corporation-a-b-corp-or-what. Others have also advocated for the socially responsible use of EB-5 
capital. Howard Patrick Barry, EB-5 as an Instrument of Sustainable Capitalism, 16 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 66, 
118 (2014) (arguing that EB-5 should be used to solve a water pollution problem).
125. Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
126. Supra note 105 and accompanying text.
127. See Peter Elkind & Marty Jones, The Dark, Disturbing World of the Visa-for-Sale Program, Fortune (July 
24, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/24/immigration-eb-5-visa-for-sale/.
128. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
129. Email from Sam Newbold, EB-5 Associate, Barst Mukamal & Kleiner LLP, to author (Jan. 30, 2015, 
5:25 PM) (on file with author).
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IV. CONCLUSION
 The EB-5 statute and regulations do not exclude nonprofit entities from the 
definition of commercial enterprise, so they are included. While the preamble to the 
regulations indicates the agency’s intention to exclude nonprofit organizations, 
nonprofits were not, in fact, excluded by the regulations. Furthermore, the regulations 
exclude noncommercial activity, but not nonprofit entities, thereby leaving room for 
nonprofit entities engaged in commercial activity. Other areas of business 
immigration law, such as PERM, National Interest Waivers, and H-1B, encompass—
and may even advantage—nonprofit entities.
 Additionally, funds contributed to a nonprofit commercial entity with donative 
intent are “at risk” within the meaning of the regulations because “at risk” is defined 
more broadly for EB-5 purposes than for E-2 purposes, which in turn allows for the 
concept of SROI. State benefit corporation statutes are demonstrative of a business 
trend to include social considerations in the idea of what constitutes a return on 
invested capital.
 The Chief of the Immigrant Investor Program, Nicholas Colucci, stated at an 
EB-5 trade conference in May of 2014, that one of the aspects he admires most 
about the program is how “the resources that can be brought to bear across the 
interagency community, particularly in coordination with not-for-profit . . . entities, 
can be extremely powerful when focused and coordinated.”130 In light of this view, 
USCIS should heed the AAO’s advice to grow and benefit from experience131 and 
expand on its narrow construction of “commercial enterprise.” The nonprofit 
commercial enterprise is compliant with the EB-5 regulations, and therefore should 
be adopted by USCIS.
130. Nicholas Colucci, Chief, Immigrant Inv. Program, USCIS, Prepared Remarks to the Association To 
Invest in the United States (IIUSA) at the EB-5 Regional Economic Development Advocacy 
Conference (May 19, 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/resources-congress/testimonies-and-speeches/
prepared-remarks-nicholas-colucci-chief-immigrant-investor-program-uscis.
131. Izummi, 22 I. & N. Dec. 169, 196 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals July 13, 1998) (“To say that an agency’s 
knowledge cannot grow, and that an agency is prohibited from benefiting from its experience, is 
unreasonable.”).
